HSE-Newsletter_banner

December 2025

🚧 Page under construction 🚧

Welcome to the HSE Newsletter, which is published twice a year and features some selected highlights for the HSE Unit. You can find the other editions here or in the side menu.

We thank the contributors and encourage anyone who has a newsworthy story to share it with us at hse-comms@cern.ch. We will then publish it on the most appropriate channel, including the CERN Bulletin or the HSE website.

Happy reading!


Contents

Story one | Story two | Story three | Story four | Story five | Story 6

 


From spreadsheets to smart safety: the new CERN Safety Incident Management (SIM) tool

HSE has launched a new Safety Incident Management (SIM) tool — a major step forward in how the Organization records, analyses, and follows up on Safety Incidents, a term that covers everything from near misses to serious accidents.

Developed by the HSE-TS Safety Computing section, led by Gustavo Segura, with Marie Laporte as lead developer, the SIM tool brings together processes that are spread across departments in different formats and systems, and centralised by HSE-OHS. We met with them to understand how the tool came about and the challenges they met along the way.

Q: Gustavo, what is the SIM tool and how did this project come about?

Gustavo: The Safety Incident Management, or SIM tool is a new CERN-wide application developed to centralise how we record, analyse and follow up on safety incidents. It responds to a key organisational need: a unified, efficient and secure way to manage incidents and the lessons we draw from them.

Until now, each department kept its own records — often in Excel sheets, shared drives or local databases. This made tracking incidents and consolidating data across the Organization extremely complex and manual, an arduous task our colleague Carine Pividori in the OHS Group has been overseeing for many years. The new CERN Safety Regulation SR-SIM (“Responsibilities in matters of Safety Incident management at CERN”), published in 2023, provided the framework for harmonising this process, and the SIM tool is the practical response to that rule. In this framework, Safety Incidents are classified as minor, serious or major, and the tool focuses on the first two categories.

The project was launched in 2024, following the work of a dedicated working group led by Andre Henriques to define the tool’s functional specifications. Completed in just 18 months, it went live in August 2025 after successful pilot testing with the EN and EP Departments and the ATLAS experiment. The effort was highly collaborative, involving representatives from departments, experiments, and HSE experts—including the CFRS and the CERN Medical Service—who contributed to shaping the tool’s requirements.

Q: Marie, can you tell us what the tool actually does?

Marie: The SIM tool records and manages all types of Safety Incidents — whether they involve people, the environment, electricity, cryogenics or any other technical domain. It’s designed mainly for HSE incident prevention team, Departmental Safety Officers (DSOs), LEXGLIMOS, and other safety experts, who, according to the SIM rules, are responsible for the analysis of Safety Incidents, the follow-up of corrective actions and Safety Incident statistics. The tool allows them to collect data, perform analyses and track actions, as well as share lessons learned.

It’s secure, user-friendly and interfaces with CERN systems such as EDMS and GIS for document management and precise incident localisation. Each incident follows a structured process: registration, analysis and reporting. Automated reports — such as “First Facts”, “Flash Info”, and “Safety Incident Reports” — make information sharing and follow-up much faster and more consistent.

Importantly, information is shared on a “need-to-know” basis to protect sensitive data. The system also includes automatic notifications to relevant users, who can then fill in the parts that concern them directly.

Q: What were some of the main challenges?

Gustavo: The biggest challenge was building consensus. People are busy, and testing a new system requires engagement and feedback. We held regular interactive meetings for every design mock-up to ensure we weren’t developing in isolation. Another challenge was data protection — we worked closely with the CERN Office of Data Protection to ensure the right level of security.

Q: What’s next for the SIM tool?

Marie: The tool is already being used for reporting and internal communication within departments and HSE. The next steps will be to extend its scope — for instance, to include Safety deviations or environmental alerts that are not yet captured. The goal is continuous improvement: better coverage, better quality of information, and faster feedback loops.

Gustavo: Integration is underway for the new occupational health information system for the medical service, called KENORA, which is already well advanced, and then the CFRS’ incident management tool will follow in 2026. The tool is already changing how people talk about incidents — we now say “SIM 12” or “SIM 33” in daily discussions. It’s become part of CERN’s Safety culture, helping us work more efficiently, consistently and, above all, safely. I have rarely seen such fast adoption and appreciation of a tool. It’s very satisfying and a great example of collaboration across HSE and CERN at large.

Caption: Example of the user dashboard view

Caption: Example of the GIS interface view

Caption: Example of a ‘Flash Info’ report


Making connections: HSE's first cosmic ray detector

Finding good students can be as challenging as detecting cosmic rays, but luckily Igor Neuhold (HSE-OHS-IB) has a solution for both of these problems. Learn more about the Danish student programme, HSE’s first cosmic ray detector, and how these two innovations have supercharged electrical safety at CERN.

To improve electrical safety inspections for short-term experiments, Igor has designed an electrical safety training aimed at CERN EP Users. For a hands-on experience he wanted to build a working particle detector, to show the Users best practices and common pitfalls in high voltage wiring. But who has the time, and the expertise, to build such a thing?

Enter Jonathan Mejenborg, a student Igor recruited via the Danish student internship programme. Studying a bachelor’s in technology management and marine engineering, Jonathan joined the electrical safety team for four months this summer. His project: to construct and create all the technical safety documentation for a cosmic ray detector as the icing on the cake for Igor’s electrical safety training course.

For Jonathan, the project will form a major part of his thesis, focusing on the safety design and lifecycle management of the device, while benefitting from immersion in the busy life of the electrical safety team and CERN’s international environment. For what concerns Igor, he gained a capable and motivated colleague to whom he could confidently delegate this important but challenging project.

The result: a high-quality demonstration tool for the Safety Training course, a memorable thesis, and strengthened connections between CERN and Danish technical institutes.

Jonathan’s has enjoyed the experience, noting, “Safety has always been part of the job. At CERN, I got to see how that’s handled on a whole different scale. I’ve learned a lot about risk assessment and communication, but also how different teams and cultures approach safety. It’s been a great experience — I’ll definitely take a lot from it.” 

If you have a small project, or something that you can easily delegate to a qualified and competent student – definitely consider the Danish internship student programme.

The full setup: Made up of standard laboratory electronics, there are hundreds of teaching opportunities designed into the detector.

Channel three displays the number of detected cosmic rays.


Evacuation drill at the CFRS: the inside story

On 26 September, our firefighters experienced an entirely new type of exercise: an unforeseen evacuation drill in their own building. An overview of the event was published in the bulletin, but the most interesting details are reserved for us in HSE. We take you on a photo walk to find out more.

1. What should happen?

Organised in absolute secrecy by HSE DSO Gunnar Lindell, Fire Officer Sarah Hansen, and the building’s TSO Adrian Pedrosa Martinez, the evacuation exercise set out to answer two questions:
1. Did everybody know and understand the correct procedures in the event of a fire in the CFRS, and could these be improved?
2. Could the CFRS themselves maintain operational capability in the event of an emergency on their premises?
Here, the small team of observers is briefed on what should happen.

PHOTO

PHOTO

2. Is that someone shouting?

For historical reasons, the fire station is not fitted with a fire detection system or alarm: the only way to warn others of the “fire” is to shout!
Sarah Hansen discreetly launched the exercise thanks to a smoke machine in the upstairs kitchen.
Once the danger was confirmed, the unmistakable message “Evacuate, Evacuate
” was broadcast via the station’s loudspeaker system.

 

3. Relocating the CFRS’ control room

Immediately, the CFRS control room staff packed up and rushed to the CCC in Prévessin, as per their protocol.
Control was re-established within ten minutes, and the team even handled an emergency call whilst in transit.

PHOTO

PHOTO

4. Evacuating the CFRS building

At the same time, Emergency Guide Eric Herbe searched the building, and safely guided all of the occupants to the assembly point: two off-duty firefighters, one of our observers, and some unfortunate contractors who had been cleaning the windows.
The value of a well-prepared and proactive emergency guide like Eric cannot be understated!

5. A rapid response

As the building was being cleared, the firefighters prepared to go in.
Interestingly, the firefighters immediately recognised the white smoke as “fake” but did not change their mindset. Today’s drill could be tomorrow’s real-life emergency.
Two firefighters were dispatched to identify the source of the problem.

PHOTO

PHOTO

6. Teamwork

The CFRS responded just as they would for any other alarm.
Whilst reconnaissance was undertaken, other firefighters set up necessary intervention equipment. Two more searched other areas of the building for people who may have not evacuated.
In the event of a real fire at the station, or of multiple emergencies, the CFRS may also call upon the Host States emergency services for additional support.

7. Surprise!

Back at the assembly point a jubilant Gunnar reassures the evacuees – and no doubt draws sighs from Eric and the firefighters – by revealing the exercise.
The observers and Safety Officers start to reflect on the process. Any initial worries were cast aside: it had gone better than anyone had imagined.

PHOTO

PHOTO

8. A return to our questions

In the “RETEX” following the exercise, organisers and firefighters involved returned to the questions that this exercise set out to ask.
Did everybody know what procedure to follow? Yes, what’s more, the versatility and experience of the personnel involved allowed them to react appropriately to novel situations where the procedures were less clear.
Was operational capability maintained? Absolutely. The fire officers were ready to call upon the host states if needed, and the transition to the CCC was flawless.


Let there be light: handing over the keys to the new RWTC access & office building

Christmas came early for CERN’s Radioactive Waste Treatment Centre (RWTC) team, with the long-awaited completion of their new access & office building in September 2025, a key element in a project that began more than a decade ago.

The story goes back to 2011, when CERN launched an ambitious project to design and build a modern facility for the safe interim storage and treatment of the radioactive waste that is continuously produced by the operation of CERN facilities. This includes everything from simple metallic tubes to complex targets Each package must be carefully characterised, sorted, packaged, treated and stored for later elimination according to agreed pathways in CERN’s Host States.

The challenge was to process not only waste that had accumulated over the years but also to accommodate waste produced each year in the LHC era—about 400 m³ during operational periods and up to 1000 m³ during Long Shutdowns—while ensuring a safe and efficient workspace for the dedicated teams behind these operations.

Enter the Intersecting Storage Rings, or ISRs: circular tunnels 15 m width, 6.5 m in height divided into octants. These were already, but only partially used for interim storage, and by 2015 a new radioactive waste treatment centre was successfully implemented in one of them: ISR octant 4, a former experimental hall, 17.5 m high and located 4 m underground, with a useful surface area of 1600 m2. In its first year of operation in 2016, more than 1000 m3 were processed. “Octant by octant” the ISR were made into a up to standards RWTC, with the team simultaneously managing refurbishment and daily operations. As former HSE Unit Head Doris Forkel-Wirth put it, it was like “living in a house while refurbishing every room.” Collaboration with SCE engineers ensured all the necessary infrastructure and processing equipment needs were met as the facility evolved.

Once the RWTC refurbishment was finished, the green light was given to build a dedicated office building, leveraging existing space connected to the existing facilities, with changing rooms, showers and appropriate access from non-designated to the controlled radiation areas with suitable fixtures. It was not a straightforward task, but after overcoming diverse technical difficulties, the office building was finally completed in September 2025.

Today, the personnel working on the RWTC activities have happily settled into this new building with natural light, which affords clear separation combined with the necessary proximity to the centre. With these achievements, the RWTC team can take a bright view for the years ahead.


Meet ABEILLE, the new ‘buzz’word in radioactive waste elimination pathways

In the course of its cutting-edge research, CERN generates different types of waste — conventional, hazardous and radioactive — each requiring its own dedicated management strategy. The Laboratory’s approach follows a key principle: minimise waste at the source, reuse when possible, and recycle or safely dispose of what remains.

When it comes to radioactive waste, CERN works under a clear framework established with its Host States, France and Switzerland, through the tripartite agreement on radiation protection and radiation safety. Waste is categorised as “candidate for clearance”, very low level (TFA), or low- and intermediate-level of short- (FMA-VC) and long-lived (FA-MA) nature. Depending on its level of activity, it follows different national disposal routes, ensuring a fair distribution between both countries.

In recent years, CERN has made major progress in the treatment and disposal of metallic FMA VC waste, which represents around 90% of its total low- and intermediate-level waste by volume. This waste, often bulky and complex to handle, requires innovative solutions to manage safely and efficiently.

One such solution was launched through the Melting of Activated STeel (MAST) project, which established CERN’s first-ever metallic FMA elimination pathway by melting. The successful start of this process in 2023 marked a significant milestone in radioactive waste management at the Laboratory.

To complement MAST, a second pathway was developed for metallic waste unsuitable for melting — the ABEILLE project (ANDRA Bulky Elimination of Intermediate and Low-Level Waste), conducted in collaboration with the French waste management agency ANDRA.

Prior to being sent to the ANDRA CSA facility (Centre de stockage de l’Aube), CERN first has the challenge of characterising and packaging it. Handling FMA waste through the ABEILLE pathway poses significant radiation protection challenges and, unlike low-level RA waste—where volumes can be reduced by up to 50%—this process actually increases the volume of FMA waste by a factor of 2.5 to 5.

The reason is the complex packaging process: CERN must use specialised, heavily shielded containers. For example, a container with an outer volume of 5 mÂł only provides 2.6 mÂł of usable space due to thick shielding. As a result, 30 mÂł of waste packages can ultimately offer as little as 9 mÂł of effective capacity.

The reason is the complex packaging process: CERN must use specialised, heavily shielded containers. For example, a container with an outer volume of 5 mÂł only provides 2.6 mÂł of usable space due to thick shielding. As a result, 30 mÂł of waste packages can ultimately offer as little as 9 mÂł of effective capacity.

After three years of development and an extensive approval process for this new pathway, CERN successfully sent and had its first ABEILLE waste received by ANDRA in 2025, officially opening this new elimination pathway. The goal is now to dispose of 5 to 40 mÂł of metallic FMA waste per year, ensuring CERN continues to meet the highest standards of environmental and radiological responsibility.